Introduction
The irony of [manufactured] risk here is that rationality, that is, the experience of the past, encourages anticipation of the wrong kind of risk, the one we believe we can calculate and control, whereas the disaster arises from what we do not know and cannot calculate.
U. Beck, 2006, p. 330 A key feature of modern society is the emergence of new characteristics of risks, which have been conceptualized by U. Beck as 'manufactured risk'. 1 Whereas in the past, risks principally consisted of natural hazards, which were limited in both time and space, manufactured risks are man-made, have a global effect, are potentially catastrophic, and can only be assessed speculatively. The global dimension of these risks has rendered apparent the latent divergence in the conceptions of risks that exist among different nations and regulatory regimes, thus resulting in tensions at and between national, regional, and international levels.
One of the entities where these conflicts are most visible is the World Trade
Organisation's (WTO) dispute settlement body, which has recently been faced with several cases relating to manufactured risk. 2 In these situations, and partially due to the WTO's need to legitimize its going beyond national sovereignty, science has gained paramount importance in providing for a neutral and objective international normative yardstick for decision-making. 3 Indeed, such function of science is exemplified in the WTO Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which
indicates that, in order to leave to Member States their discretion to set the levels of protection, the WTO only 'disciplines' the existing risk assessments, thus ensuring that the risk regulations are appropriately based on science. In this respect, a clear-cut distinction is made between risk assessment, which provides for objectivity and authority, and risk management, which is expected to appropriately respond with policy decisions. 4 The undisputed reliance on science, in case of manufactured risk, is problematic concerning two central aspects. Firstly, 'risk' is stil mainly conceptualised according to the traditional theory, which states that risk can be managed by rationally evaluating the probability of its occurrence and measuring it against the extent of the harm that might be caused by a disaster. 5 However, due to the speculative characteristic of manufactured risk, no historical data exist regarding the probability, the form, or even the existence of these risks. As these aspects can only be evaluated retrospectively, a mere positivistic 6 description of what manufactured risk consists of is drastically jeopardised. Secondly, the way science is being used as an 'internationallyardstick' fails to acknowledge and problematize the ways science may be politicised, thus potentially leading to a misuse of scientific knowledge when dealing with manufactured risk.
Consequently, this paper will investigate some potential effects of the current use of science with regard to manufactured risk. To start with, the WTO's approach towards science and its limiting definition of risk, appears not only incomplete vis-à-vis emerging forms of risk, but also ignores the practical inability of science to be used as a decisive tool in dispute settlement. Subsequently, the demeanour of displaying scientific knowledge as complete, unequivocal, and authoritative as well as disregarding the existence of various forms of uncertainty results in a de facto impediment of Member States' freedom to "determine their own appropriate level of sanitary protection". section, the paper will analyse the various facets on which the scientific evidence presented by Member States and the EC agencies conflict. Finally, the way the WTO Panel 'disciplined' the risk assessments, according to applicable law, will be investigated. Based on the analysis of the EC-Biotech case, diverging manners by which science is being politicised will be identified. In particular, the paper will investigate how different types of uncertainty are being ignored or disregarded, thus ultimately leading to the limitation of available evidence on which Member States can base their safeguard measures.
In conclusion, the argument substantiated in this paper is that, due to the characteristics of manufactured risk and the inherent politicisation of science, under no circumstances should science be used as the most important normative yardstick in the WTO decisionmaking process. Additionally, this paper claims that in order to appropriately deal with manufactured risk and its speculative characteristic, scientific risk assessment should not only attempt to positively assess the risk, but as well attribute a major importance to all identified forms of uncertainty.
Conceptual Framework

ManufacturedRisk
It is useful to recal that 'risk' is not a natural category, but a concept that has been contingently defined to render a given reality intelligible. In this context, the definition of risk, and what it refers to, varies greatly. As the literature on risk perception demonstrates, the term 'risk' is composed by numerous factors that complexly interact and differ from one culture to another. 11 Consequently, the way 'risk' is defined, sets the relevant criteria in the governance of risk, thus having great repercussions on the perceptions of risk as well as on the manner it is being dealt with.
Historically, the concept of risk seems to have made its first appearance, in the western world, with reference to the danger of sailing in uncharted waters and the cost of potential loss of shipments. 12 However, it is only in the 19 th century, that the term 'risk'
became dominant over the notion of 'hazard', and its usage in the English literature has boomed since the 1960s. By speculative, Giddens refers to the fact that, despite extensive scientific knowledge, uncertainties might persist with regard to whether these risks actually exist, as well as the exact form they could take or the way to calculate them. 19 In this regard, scientific expertise holds an unsettled role. On the one hand, many manufactured risks transcend our sensory capacities and, as such, require the help of science to render such risks manageable. On the other hand, the uncertainties caused by the futurity of the risk and its incalculability cannot be simply dispelled by yet further scientific advance.
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The authors argue that, the concept of manufactured risk is useful to grasp some of the empirical characteristics of risk relating to genetically modified organisms, and improve the quality of regulatory decisions on such kind of risk. 21 Firstly, GMOs are the results of scientific and technological development, and the willingness to impose the human design upon nature. 22 Secondly, once released in nature they become impossible to be retrieved to the laboratory, as the manufactured risk does not disappear after the harvest. Thirdly, GMOs are traded and cultivated worldwide, thus, in case harmful effects were to be detected, the extent of the damage would be global and unlimited in time.
Finally, the risk related to GMOs remains speculative and hence, the ability of science and technology to deal with them is severely impeded. Consequently, the following parts of the paper will be concerned with framing and identifying the issues arising from current perceptions of risk when dealing with manufactured risk.
PrecautionandTypesofUncertainty
The emergence of the widely debated precautionary principle, in the last quarter of the 20 th century in Europe, can be indirectly considered as an attempt to respond to manufactured risks. Indeed, in the light of their speculative nature, the lack of historical experience and of consensus on the relevant criteria to be assessed, the uncertainties surrounding the potential risk need to be addressed. 23 In this regard, it does not come as a surprise that the current literature on risk governance and the precautionary principle refers to 'uncertainty' as a central aspect for the establishment of precautionary measures.
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However, the notion of 'uncertainty' is a broad concept that contains diverse meanings.
In this respect, a meta-analysis of the various uses of the term 'uncertainty' al ows the authors to distinguish four types of uncertainty.
The first, and most criticized, type of uncertainty consists of what has been referred to as the Knightian conceptualization of uncertainty. 25 Knight was an economist that perceived uncertainty as being clearly distinguishable from risk. From this perspective, uncertainty only amounts to a temporary lack of data that disables risk to be assessed.
Once the scientific evidence is sufficient, the uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, precautionary measures can only be taken if it is proven that the current body of scientific knowledge clearly lacks some information. In such case, precautionary measures apply for 23 Additionally, as great amount of the social science literature on the subject pointed out, the process of risk assessment should include social scientists and even the participation of the citizens. Indeed, since 'risk' is not a natural category but a social one, it is of prime relevance that all the sta keholders can adequately be represented in the definition of 'risk'. 26 In this context, uncertainty is, inter alia, perceived as a lack of consensus among the scientific community. In reality, scientific practice bases itself on collected data, among which specific information will be selected in order to develop, through different strategies and methodologies, new theories. This complex process generally results in disagreement within the scientific community as to which data are relevant and how should they be interpreted. These disputes may persevere but wil typically reach a consensus (also referred as 'closure'). Such consensus is generally not the result of the gathering of new scientific evidence, but of a complex process in which relevant actors, come to interactively construct common definitions and meanings.
The third type of uncertainty, 'system complexity', is a general tenet of ecological science, 27 and is particularly problematized by C. Perrow in Normal Accidents. 28 In essence,
Perrow argues that, in systems which are both 'complex' and 'tightly' coupled, inherent and irreducible risk will persist. Indeed, the complexity of a system implies that, due to the multiplicity and the entanglement of the interactions between components, uncertainty will always remain. Nuclear energy or DNA changes are examples of such tight and complex systems -in such cases, the uncertainty is inherent to the physical properties of the system. 29 Moreover, ecological science advocates for a perspective recognising the complexity of the interactions between the components, whereas mainstream laboratory science, which attempts to identify the causal relation between components, tends to decontextualize them from the environment they would naturally evolve in.
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The fourth, and final, kind of uncertainty is tightly related to the second one, but instead focuses on uncertainty as an inherent and irreducible part of scientific practice.
Due to various aspects intrinsic to the practice of science, such as the clash of scientific It is relevant to emphasise that all these types of uncertainty are not mutually exclusive.
On the contrary, the authors believe that the assessment of manufactured risk should explicitly address an array of different types of uncertainty. Additionally, a distinction between, on the one hand, the kinds of uncertainty that can be dealt with (type one and two), and the ones that are irreducible and inherent (three and four), is observable. Lastly, one can notice that some types of uncertainty account for ontological characteristics while others are related to the practice of science itself (i.e. to epistemological characteristics).
In general, epistemological types of uncertainty should not necessarily be equated with risk. For instance, while uncertainty as conflicting scientific perspectives does not allow scientific knowledge to authoritatively speak with one voice, it remains a beneficial kind of uncertainty as it presents differing angles on a risk. Uncertainty as a lack of data (Knight, 1921) Uncertainty as system complexity (Perrow, 1984) Uncertainty as a lack of consensus/closure (latour, 2004; Busch et al, 2004) Uncertainty as conflicting scientific perspectives (van Asselt & Vos, 2007) 
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answers that may predetermine a specific regulatory outcome. 41 In the context of the current analysis of manufactured risk, the term 'uncertainty intolerance' refers specifically to situations when particular kinds of uncertainty are being disregarded by risk assessors or decision makers. Once the scientific evidence has been politicised, the scientification of politics generally follows in the form of impeding on the discretion of Member States to set their levels of protection.
EC Biotech & Bt-176
In order to assess the politicisation of science when dealing with manufactured risks and uncertainty on a global scale, the EC-Biotech case and the dispute concerning the authorization of the GMO Bt-176 maize is significant. The objections brought forward by Canada, Argentina and the United States against the implementation of safeguard measures by the EC Member States reveal the difficulties arising due to the characteristics of manufactured risks. Therefore, it is an essential part of this paper to set the approach of the complaining countries in context with the arguments of the Member States, the evaluation of the Panel, and the defence of the EC.
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The various approaches of how modern manufactured risks, as exemplified by Bt-176, and the inherent uncertainty, have been coped with and valued on the national and international levels will be examined. Furthermore, in this case, science had a paramount importance for the WTO Panel to assess whether Member States' sanitary and phytosanitary measures were appropriately based on an assessment of risk.
In particular, as laid down in the Panel report, 43 the complaints mainly concerned two matters. To begin with, the EC's approval procedure for GMO products was claimed to be unfairly constructed, putting the complaining countries' exported products at a disadvantage. Furthermore, safeguard measures maintained by Germany, Austria, and In order to set the framework for the subsequent analysis, a factual description of the Bt-176 maize and its authorization procedure in the EC will be presented in the following section. As already assessed in the conceptual introduction, GMOs, including
Bt-176 maize, exemplify the difficulties arising when dealing with manufactured risks since these can only be assessed speculatively. This specific GMO was banned in Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, accepted by the European Communities, and finally assessed by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the EC-Biotech case. Accordingly, the analysis of Bt-176 maize exemplifies the way science is being politicised in the process of dealing with manufactured risk.
Bt stands for Bacillus thuringiensis, a soil bacterium which produces proteins harming specific insect species. 51 Responsible for the production of those proteins is among others the gene Cr1Ab. By inserting it into the DNA of maize plants, the manufacturer confers to the plant a built-in resistance against harmful insect attacks. Bt-176 targets specifically the European corn borer, a crop pest that frequently causes damages to maize in Europe and North America. By cultivating Bt-176, instead of traditional maize plants, significant economic losses in the agricultural sector could allegedly be prevented. 
EC scientific Agencies
Having provided the necessary conceptual and factual framework, now it will be examined how science is used as a political tool on the European and national levels.
In order to do so, the wording of the EC scientific agencies when dealing with Bt-176 maize, the corresponding responses by Member States, as well as the assessment of their arguments by the agencies, will be analysed. Specifically, it this part will examine which types of uncertainity are recognised by the scientists and how these are being dealt with within the context of manufactured risk. Thereby, it becomes clear that by not taking into Even under optimal experimental in vitro conditions, a successful transformation has not been achieved.
59 SCAN (n55); SCF (n55); SCPE (n55).
60 A more detailed examination of the risk assessment carried out by Ciba-Geigy would have been interesting for our analysis. However, the corporate affairs office of Syngenta did not reply to our request.
In its conclusion, the SCAN points out that "[e]xperts agreed that horizontal gene transfer from plant to prokaryotic organisms can be excluded on present scientific evidence."
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The scientific experts conclude from the low probability that the risk of a transfer can be 'excluded', thus not leaving discretion for varying opinions. This decision indicates that the scientists give meaning to the scientific evidence, thus shaping risk management, and influencing later political decisions.
Meanwhile, the risk assessment carried out by the Austrian Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Frauen (1997) comes to a similar evaluation regarding the probability of The word 'unacceptable' arguably indicates that Austria in this case takes a value-laden decision. However, this document constitutes of the Austrian letter to the Commission justifying their safeguard measures. In this regard, it is not solely a risk assessment, but also 62 SCAN (n55).
a part of risk management. A normative stance is therefore not surprising, as the decisionmakers are expected to take a decision with regard to the authorisation or ban of the product.
This case demonstrates how the approaches of the European and national risk experts vary significantly regarding the way they deal with uncertainties resulting from a lack of consensus in science. Both SCAN and the Austrian authorities agree that the likelihood of a gene transfer is extremely low. However, the SCAN implies in its conclusion that the product is harmless, while the Austrian authorities consider that this outcome renders the admission of the product 'unacceptable'. They perceive the currently limited scientific knowledge regarding the potential risk as a sufficient reason to invoke precautionary measures.
This viewpoint is reaffirmed in the conclusion of the Austrian opinion:
[...] the scientific evaluation of possible risks can not be conclusive, as many relevant mechanisms are not fully understood or investigated by now. Furthermore, the highly unlikely risks have to be compared to the fact that high amounts of plant material containing the relevant gene will be given to humans and animals for a long time after an admission of the product to the market. One has also to realise that this product contains the discussed ampicillin resistance gene as well as one more herbicide resistance marker gene which is not any longer state of the art for the production of genetically modified plants.
There are adequate maize products already available which do not comprise these restrictions and by this there is no reason to accept risks which are difficult to assess.
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The state's authority reemphasises its refusal to take the risk of approving a product whose future impact on health and environment is uncertain. By referring to "many relevant mechanisms [that] are not fully understood", it seems that the Austrian authorities are referring to uncertainty seen as a result of system complexity which cannot be assessed. has not yet been examined. In the author's interpretation, they are concerned with the uncertainty as a result of system complexity in ecological science which cannot be simulated under in vitro conditions. In laboratory research, only a limited amount of controllable actions between the studied objects can be included. Whereas, an ecological field study, where the product is tested in the complex natural environment, and where it is almost impossible to predict all possible influences, was not carried out by any of the Member States or agencies.
The German opinion, justifying the country's ban of Bt-176 maize, identified uncertainty in another area.
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Germany put forward the study of Hansen and Obrycki that found "significant larval mortality of monarch larvae (a butterfly species) fed on host plants exposed to Bt-pollen concentrations representative of those in the field for Bt-176
[A2] and MON810." Most recently, Hansen and Obrycki (2000) found significant larval mortality of monarch larvae fed on host plants 67 Unfortunately, we were not able to examine the reasoned opinions which Germany and Luxembourg submitted to the Commissions. Despite sending several emails, the respective national departments did not reply to our requests. Instead, we have retrieved the information regarding the German justification from the reaction document of the SCP (2000).
68 Laura C Hansen and John J Obrycki, 'Field deposition of Bt transgenic corn pollen: lethal effects on the monarch butterfly' (2000) 125 Oecologia 241.
exposed to Bt-pollen concentrations representative of those in the field for Bt-176 and MON810. However analytical results of toxin levels in the Bt-pollen used in the experiment were variable and differed from the expected toxin levels published elsewhere (EPA 1999a , EPA 1999b .
From this point the SCP scientists concluded:
The implications of such studies have to be considered against the level of expression of Bt-toxin in pollen of the different Bt-maizes, the local timing and duration of pollen release in relation to the life cycles and development of lepidopteran larvae and the rapid decline of pollen deposition with distance from the source crop.
In particular, the interpretation and prediction of effects in the field should be viewed against the comparative risk assessment of alternative crop protection practices and exposure to insecticide sprays. The SCP concludes that the studies cited in the German submission in vitro tests.
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The SCP's scientists assessed here the indications for side-effects which could harm non-target organisms and came to the conclusion that the studies treating the subject are complex to assess. In addition, it was expressed that it is difficult to evaluate whether results obtained in the laboratory would also hold valid under field conditions. Additionally, the SCP pointed out that scientific findings were contradictive, and that the work of Hansen and Obrycki stands in opposition to other studies.
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While the Austrian concern with regard to system complexity in ecological circumstances has already been discussed, this can also be seen as a case where uncertainty resulting from a lack of consensus is dealt with differently by the parties.
On the one hand, the German authorities base their position on a study which points towards potential risks for the monarch butterfly, thereby contradicting the original risk assessment's results that non-target organisms are safe. On the other hand, the SCP 69 SCP (57).
Hansen and Obrycki (n68).
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refuses to accept this research as a sufficient reason to reject the studies on which the original assessment was based. It is the authors' understanding that, at this point, the two parties interpret uncertainty as a lack of consensus in the scientific community differently.
Germany apparently considers that contradicting scientific positions are a sufficient reason to take precautionary measures against the product, while the SCP still upholds the conclusions from the original assessment as correct.
In conclusion, the analysis of the risk assessment documents indicates that uncertainty, particularly as a result of a lack of consensus and system complexity, is interpreted differently by Member States and the scientific studies they refer ,to on the one hand, and the EU expert bodies, on the other hand.
This conflict is however not a matter of 'who knows best', but rather of the two sides'
clash on how to deal with these types of uncertainty. Member States seem overall more apt to acknowledge them. In the original risk assessments of the EU scientific bodies, they did not play a role, while in their response to the Member States' concerns uncertainties are mentioned but disregarded, leading to the conclusion that no new evidence has been submitted. As it will be demonstrated in the next part, this position, in conjunction with the WTO Panel's interpretation of the SPS agreement, eventually led to completely disregard the uncertainties presented in the Member States' documents.
Disciplining Risk Assessments at the WTO -
The EC-Biotech case as it will be demonstrated later in this paper.
As presented in the conceptual framework, the politicization of science can occur in different forms: two of which concerning the way risk is being naturalized and the way recognized scientific evidence is being reduced to the extent that Member States no longer have the possibility to freely set their own levels of protection. In this part, it will be demonstrated how the scientific evidence presented by Austria, Germany and Luxembourg 
ManufacturedRisk
The WTO has developed a few measures which seem to apply within the context of manufactured risk. Even though the originators did not intend this effect, the introduction of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows the application of precautionary measures 72 in case of insufficiency of scientific evidence. As manufactured risks are speculative and uncertain, this appears to be an adequate provision to deal with them. Furthermore, since not only quantitative risk assessments but also qualitative ones 73 are allowed at the WTO level, it allows in theory a wider range of scientific evidence to be accepted. However, and as will be demonstrated later, these steps are not always sufficient in order to properly tackle manufactured risks.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a complex notion which comprises different aspects, among which four have been emphasized in relation to manufactured risks. 74 In this respect, it is important 
Riskassessment-Article5.1andAnnexA(4)SPSAgreement
In this section, it will be demonstrated how the risk assessment requirements laid down in the SPS Agreement represent a narrow understanding of such assessment for manufactured risks, and triggers several issues. First, the current interpretation of risk assessment leads to the naturalization of risk due to its demand to positively assess the risk through inappropriate legal requirements. Second, these constraints reduce the array of possible outcomes for Member States to decide the risk management policies they deemed necessary. In other words, the Panel considered that the Members failed to qualitatively assess the risk. However, only a few paragraphs were dedicated to this dismissal and no concrete evidence of this lack of assessment was given. This blurry interpretation leaves Member
States ignorant of the criteria applied by the Panel when the latter considered whether a risk is qualitatively assessed. There seems to be a lack of consistency in this interpretation where the evaluation of potential or likelihood rests on arbitrary or unclear requirements solely known by the Panel.
Furthermore, when the Panel assessed these documents, the way it used science may be subject to criticism. Firstly, such interpretation of the scientific studies seems to result in the naturalisation of science in the sense that the Panel conceived 'risk' as an objective notion that can, and must, be assessed positively through the use of scientific evidence.
As shown above, merely pointing out the possibility and/or the existence of uncertainties 76 Namely Austria, Germany and Luxembourg.
77 Panel Report, EC-Biotech, paras. 7.2655 (Austria); 7.2806 (Germany); 7.2915 (Luxembourg) 78 According to Annex A(4), a risk assessment can either be the "evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member" or the "evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs" (emphasis added). level of protection they wish to set, based on the available scientific evidence.
'Basedon'aRiskAssessment-Article5.1SPSAgreement
In the present section, several points will be made regarding the requirement for a SPS measure to be based on a risk assessment. First, the different types of uncertainty recognized by the Panel will be shown, and the implications of such recognition will be presented. Second, this part will explain the consequences of the Panel's decision that the Member States' divergent views must be explicitly included in the original risk assessment.
Finally, the claim that the Members failed to explain how and why they assessed the risks in a different way than the EC agencies will be questioned.
The Panel, after establishing that the documents provided for by the Member States did not amount to 'risk assessments', 82 went on to see whether Austria's, Germany's and Luxembourg's safeguard measures were 'based on' any risk assessments conducted by the EC scientific agencies. The Panel concluded that the safeguard measures could not be considered to be based on any risk assessments.
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82 Within the meaning of Annex A(4) SPS Agreement.
83 Panel Report, EC-Biotech case, paras. 7.3086 (Austria); 7.3158 (Germany); 7.3212 (Luxembourg). The arguments presented in the case of Austria's safeguard measure on T25 maize applied mutatis mutandis to Austria's, Germany's and Luxembourg's safeguard measures on Bt-176 maize (Panel Report, EC-Biotech case, paras. 7.3085; 7.3157; 7.3211).
The EC argued that Members may use divergent scientific opinion based on new information rather than mainstream scientific opinion, and it was so in the present instance.
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The Panel accepted this claim as it was already established in EC-Hormones, wherein the Appellate Body accepted that risk assessments could be based on prevailing/mainstream opinion but also based on diverging scientific views as long as they were from respected and qualified sources. 85 This has been accepted and allowed especially in situations of lifethreatening risks constituting a "clear and imminent threat to public health and safety".
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However, the Panel pointed out that this was applicable only in cases where the divergent opinion was part of the original risk assessment, which was not presently the case. Indeed, the Panel could not see any divergent views expressed in the agencies' risk assessment. 87 Therefore, the Panel decided that the EC-Hormones' decision -that risk assessments can be based on diverging scientific evidence -could not be applied to the current situation. In the Panel's view, safeguard measures based on a divergent scientific opinion could not be based on a risk assessment that establishes a single opinion with no reference to the divergent view.
Previously, the Panel stated that when the Members face a situation where it is possible to conduct a risk assessment because of sufficient relevant scientific evidence, they may take into consideration the uncertainties present in the result and conclusion of the assessment to set their SPS measures. In this context, the risk assessment can support several outcomes and conclusions which may be the basis for different measures.
The Panel defines these uncertainties as for example, "uncertainties linked to certain assumptions made in the course of the performance of a risk assessment". 88 However, it seems they can only be relied on if they are explicitly mentioned in the risk assessment.
84 Panel Report, EC-Biotech case, para. 7.3057.
85 "A risk assessment could set out both the prevailing view representing the 'mainstream' of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of scientists taking a divergent view" (Appellate Body Report, ECHormones, para. 194).
86 Appellate Body Report, 87 Panel Report, EC-Biotech case, para. 7.3059.
88 Panel Report, EC-Biotech, para. 7.1525. ("[T]he mere fact that relevant scientific evidence is sufficient to perform a risk assessment does not mean that the result and conclusion of the risk assessment are free from uncertainties (e.g. uncertainties linked to certain assumptions made in the course of the performance of a risk assessment). Indeed, we consider that such uncertainties may be legitimately taken into account by a Member when determining the SPS measure, if any, to be taken. In view of these uncertainties, a given risk assessment may well support a range of possible measures. Within this range, a Member is at liberty to choose the one which provides the best protection to human health and/or the environment, taking account of its appropriate level of protection, provided that the measure chosen is reasonable supported by the risk assessment and not inconsistent with other applicable provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Article 5.6.") Additionally, the Panel did not wish to imply that it is impossible to rely partly on a current risk assessment exposing a single opinion, to show divergent opinions. However, it stated that,
[…] to the extent they disagree with some or al of the conclusions contained in such an assessment, it would in our view be necessary for Members to explain, by reference to the existing assessment, how and why they assess the risks differently, and to provide their revised or supplemental assessment of the risks.
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According to the Panel, the Member States failed to do so.
The 'based on requirement' is the second means a Member may implement a safeguard measure at the WTO level. If it did not fulfil the first requirement of Article 5.1 -to have its scientific studies recognized as a 'risk assessment' -it can attempt to show that its SPS measure is 'based on' another existing and recognized assessment, in the present case, the EC original risk assessments.
The first point that can be raised regarding the Panel's decision is that it explicitly recognizes the uncertainty as the lack of scientific consensus 90 as wel as "uncertainties linked to certain assumptions made in the course of the performance of a risk assessment".
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It thus broadens the scope of recognized uncertainties to tackle manufactured risks in a more adequate manner. However, it has proven to be insufficient and profitless because of the stringency of the legal requirements in Annex A(4) -i.e. potential and likelihood -which render the possibility for Members' scientific reports to be recognized as 'risk he mere fact that relevant scientific evidence is sufficient to perform a risk assessment does not mean that the result and conclusion of the risk assessment are free from uncertainties (e.g. uncertainties linked to certain assumptions made in the course of the performance of a risk assessment). Indeed, we consider that such uncertainties may be legitimately taken into account by a Member when determining the SPS measure, if any, to be taken. In view of these uncertainties, a given risk assessment may well support a range of possible measures. Within this range, a Member is at liberty to choose the one which provides the best protection to human health and/or the environment, taking account of its appropriate level of protection, provided that the measure chosen is reasonable supported by the risk assessment and not inconsistent with other applicable provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Article 5.6.") assessments' onerous. Thus, if the Members do not pass the first hurdle of proving the potential or likelihood of the risks, they are unable to take advantage of the other types of uncertainty acknowledged by the Panel.
Secondly, it is interesting to see that the Members' different interpretation of scientific evidence and their additional scientific information would only be recognized if they were explicitly included in the original risk assessment on which they wish to base their safeguard measures. Indeed, the Panel stressed the fact that diverging views and uncertainties regarding the result or conclusion of the risk assessment must be mentioned in the original assessment for them to rely on. However, since the scientific agencies did not recognize that the documents provided by the Members submitted for additional scientific information, even though they recognized its validity in itself, the measures were deemed not to be based on the original assessment but rather on their own modified and divergent assessment. The agencies did not include any divergent views which could have represented the Members' concerns regarding the potential risks linked to the marketing of Bt-176 maize. The issue with the requirement that the Members' scientific findings must be included in the original assessment for them to be recognized, is that it leaves a very slim possibility for Member States to have their evidence accepted since the agencies' risk assessments are politicized, as previously demonstrated.
Finally, the Panel stated that the Members should have explained how and why they assessed the risks differently compared to the way they were assessed by the EC agencies since they fundamentally disagreed with the original assessment. It is questionable whether they did not do so since they provided for documents and scientific studies that show the possibility of potential adverse effects Bt-176 maize has on human or animal health and the environment. 92 They attempted to show, based on scientific evidence from a divergent source, that the risk assessments conducted by the agencies were not free from any challenge. This is even more striking in the case of Luxembourg, where the Reasons document explicitly refers to scientific information provided by the EC scientific committees. 93 The EC committees acknowledged the fact that, when using Bt-176 maize, the risk that antibiotic resistance would develop because of the gene transfer to bacteria in the gut of humans or animals existed, though small. However, the EC scientific experts dismissed this potential adverse effect due to its low chance of manifestation whereas the Luxembourg authorities were concerned by its possible occurrence. 
Uncertainty as insufficiency of scientific evidence
After holding that the Members' measures regarding Bt-176 maize did not comply with 
The Panel's definition of insufficiency of scientific evidence
The Panel reviewed the arguments of the EC to see whether there was indeed a case of insufficient scientific evidence. The Members' measures, when submitted to the EC, were reviewed by the EC scientific agencies 97 in order to check whether, on the basis of the information provided by the Members, there was a risk for human health or to the environment. However, the agencies did not consider that the information provided was 'new scientific evidence' that would overturn the risk assessment that had previously been conducted by the EC agencies. 98 The Panel deemed that the agencies had "effectively reviewed their original risk assessment in the light of the information presented" 99 by
Germany and came to the conclusion that their risk assessments were still valid and were not altered in any way. The opinions by the EC scientific committees which were expressed for the EC approval procedures (i.e. the original assessments), as well as the opinions by the EC scientific committees which were delivered after the adoption of the Members' SPS measures (i.e. the review assessments) were considered by the Panel as risk assessments within the meaning of Annex A(4) and Article 5.1. Therefore, in the Panel's view, the EC did not prove that the safeguard measures were adopted due to a lack of scientific evidence since the review assessments and the original assessments of Bt-176 maize showed that, at the time the SPS measures were adopted, there was sufficient scientific evidence to conduct an adequate risk assessment within the meaning of Annex A (4) Compartmentalizing the different forms of uncertainty in the application of the different articles and rejecting others denies the possibility of acknowledging the complexity Members and other actors may face when dealing with manufactured risks. Therefore, the legal existence of the certain types of evidence is not recognized due to the restrictive bases on which scientific evidence can be accepted at the WTO level, and due to the restrictive acknowledgment of the different forms of uncertainty.
FinalRemarks
108 Panel Report, EC-Biotech, para. 7.1525. ("[T] he mere fact that relevant scientific evidence is sufficient to perform a risk assessment does not mean that the result and conclusion of the risk assessment are free from uncertainties (e.g. uncertainties linked to certain assumptions made in the course of the performance of a risk assessment). Indeed, we consider that such uncertainties may be legitimately taken into account by a Member when determining the SPS measure, if any, to be taken. In view of these uncertainties, a given risk assessment may well support a range of possible measures. Within this range, a Member is at liberty to choose the one which provides the best protection to human health and/or the environment, taking account of its appropriate level of protection, provided that the measure chosen is reasonable supported by the risk assessment and not inconsistent with other applicable provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Article 5.6.").
PoliticisationofScienceintheProcess ofDealingwithManufacturedRisk AnInterdisciplinaryCaseStudy
The reduction of scientific evidence from one level (EU) to the other (WTO) has two main consequences: first, it leads to a scientification of politics in the sense that it impedes Member States to exercise their discretionary powers by setting the level of protection they deem appropriate. Second, it fails to properly respond to the challenges of manufactured risks, characterized by their global effects, their uncertainties and the speculative nature of their risks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated how science has been politicised in the risk assessment of the EC scientific agencies and in the EC-Biotech case concerning the regulation of the Bt-176 maize. In particular, the authors have identified two main forms of politicisation that highly contributed to the regulatory outcomes.
First, the risk of the genetically modified products considered in the EC-Biotech case was politically framed by the Panel as a natural category which could be defined on the sole basis of scientific knowledge. This is particularly visible in the requirements expressed in Article 5.1 and Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement and the Panel's interpretation thereof, which require the SPS measures to be appropriately based on an assessment of risk, and that, such risk assessment must be grounded on scientific evidence that evaluate the potential and likelihood of the risk. In this respect, not only is risk being naturalised, but, in addition, it is considered that an appropriate definition of risk can be positively expressed.
Secondly, we have demonstrated that science is being politically used with the expectations that it could provide for a single authoritative answer. This process takes place at the EC scientific agencies in a risk assessment that does not display the uncertainties that the experts are being faced with, At the level of the EC scientific agencies, it is relevant to notice that no reference to 'lack of data' could be identified. However, this is hardly surprising considering that lack of data, as understood by the WTO Panel, amounts to the impossibility to conduct a risk assessment based on the available information. Since the experts concluded their risk assessments, and responded to the Member State's documents, this form of uncertainty is effectively 'dispel ed'. On the other hand, 'lack of consensus' was acknowledged by the SCP when assessing the evidence provided by Member States. However, by claiming that this evidence "do [es] not invalidate the original risk assessments", 113 the uncertainty is, in fact, not integrated in
In conclusion, the politicisation of science, as described above, ultimately resulted in the scientification of politics, i.e. in the reduction, due to the authoritative use of science, though some leeway is left for improvements in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement, the way risk is being naturalised and positively defined, as well as the rejection of most types of uncertainty, do not seem to allow the WTO to appropriately deal with manufactured risk. Therefore, it seems necessary to reconsider how existing guidelines can be accommodated to risks bearing the characteristics of manufactured risk. 
